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DIALOGUE IN AN AGE OF ENCLOSURE: 
EXPLORING THE VALUES OF CULTURAL STUDIES 
 
    NICK COULDRY 
 
[paper submitted to the Review of Education/Pedagogy/Cultural Studies, September 
2000] 
 
‘to exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it . . . Dialogue . . . must not be 
a situation where some men name on behalf of others.’ 
   Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972, 61-62) 
  
‘the real problem . . . is that people’s questions are not answered by the existing 
distribution of the educational curriculum.’ 
  Raymond Williams, ‘The future of cultural studies’ (1989a: 160) 
 
It is a platitude of educational reformers, on the right, the left and the old left which 
now claims the mantle of the new centre, that we live in a fast-changing world and 
education’s duty is to prepare us for it. Less common is the insight that such ‘change’ 
is not definable apart from conflicts of value and therefore power, which a genuinely 
democratic practice of education must address. Education should not be reduced to 
training people to accommodate to other people’s definitions of change; it must in 
Paulo Freire’s sense be a dialogue. But it is precisely this vision of education that is 
currently under threat.  
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You can risk the whole authority of academic practice on the idea that it transcends 
questions of value. That was Max Weber’s (1991 [1921]) vision of sociology for a 
world which he saw as riven by irreconcilable conflicts of value; to mix science with 
values or politics was to fall into ‘prophecy’ or ‘demagoguery’. Given the 
compromised racial politics of academic life in Germany in the early twentieth 
century, we cannot dismiss Weber’s vision lightly. Alternatively, you can base a 
subject on the belief that at certain times it is precisely commitments of value that 
academics need to make, clearly and unequivocally. It is this ‘political’ conception of 
education and intellectual work that has characterised cultural studies. In this article, I 
want to do two things: to explore what the underlying values of cultural studies are, 
and to illustrate why they matter particularly in the current state of educational 
politics, in Britain and perhaps elsewhere.  
  
In exploring the distinctive values of cultural studies, a useful reference-point remains 
the vision of Raymond Williams, developed in Britain principally in the 1950s and 
1960s. The position is complicated, because, since Williams’ early writings, all 
questions of value in intellectual work have undergone a fundamental displacement: a 
decentreing of the very basis on which intellectual and scientific authority is claimed 
or assumed. What was primarily a conversation within the ambit of ‘the West’ and 
within a largely unquestioned patriarchal and racially specific authority must now be a 
conversation that is decentred, open-ended, and global. And yet a fundamental 
principle that Williams articulated was dialogue and an interrogation of power’s 
investments in cultural value. So we need, not to jettison Williams’ work, but to 
isolate its key principles and explore how they resonate with work done in other 
places and times. It was in a similar spirit, I believe, that Edward Said (1978: 28) in 
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one of the most devastating attacks on the intellectual authority of ‘the West’ 
acknowledged Williams’ (1961) vision of transcending the ‘long dominative mode’ of 
thinking about culture.  
 
Whatever its limitations, Williams’ work kept worrying away at an essential but 
deceptively simple question: why does it matter that we study ‘our’ culture, ‘ordinary’ 
culture (Williams, 1989b) and how best can we do it within an institutional 
framework? This breaks down into a number of specific questions:  
 
• What are the values embedded in, or excluded from, the cultural spaces in which I 
have been formed?  
• To what extent can I call those embedded values my own, and to what extent 
should I be critical of them?  
• Is that space a democratic one? If not, why not, and what might make it 
democratic? 
• what are the conditions of a ‘common culture’ (Williams, 1958: 305) and what 
values underpin them? 
 
These are, by definition, public questions, part of a wider dialogue. Putting them at 
the heart of the academic study of culture is the starting-point of cultural studies as a 
discipline. Unfortunately, for us as for Williams, this orientation puts cultural studies 
at odds with the prevailing educational logics of the day.  
 
In the first section, I will explore what Williams meant by the ‘ordinariness’ of 
culture, and show the parallels with approaches to culture developed elsewhere: in 
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Kenya (the work of Ngugi wa Thiong’o) and in Colombia (the work of Jesus Martin-
Barbero). In the second section I discuss some of the limitations of Williams’ vision 
and how it must be transposed, if it is to remain a useful reference-point for 
contemporary cultural politics. This transposition is all the more vital, I argue in the 
third section, given the threat to educational dialogue from its reduction to commerce; 
as an example, I discuss the inadequate concept of education of even a relatively 
sympathetic institutional reformer, Charles Leadbeater, a leading adviser to Tony 
Blair’s New Labour government in Britain.   
 
I then attempt to draw together the principles common to various visions of cultural 
studies, before reflecting in the conclusion on the connections between such abstract 
principles and practical pedagogy and citizenship.   
 
The Ordinariness of Culture 
 
‘Culture is ordinary’, Raymond Williams famously wrote. His point was not to 
replace a notion of culture (as specific, legitimated works) with a looser notion of 
culture as life process, but to hold both notions of culture in tension. Instead of seeing 
the artistic work (such as the nineteenth century English novel) in the abstract, 
Williams insisted on thinking about how it emerged from a much broader range of 
cultural practice, what he called a ‘cultural formation’, a shared practice of making 
meanings involving everyone in a particular culture. 
 
These connections are brought out in the following passage from an essay originally 
published in 1958: 
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Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has its own shape, its 
own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expressed these, in 
institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of 
common meanings and directions . . . The growing society is there, yet it is also 
made and remade in every individual mind. . . . A culture has two aspects: the 
known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new 
observances and meanings, which are offered and tested. These are the ordinary 
processes of human societies and human minds, and we see through them the 
nature of a culture: that is always both traditional and creative; that it is both the 
most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings. We use the 
word culture in these two senses: to mean a whole way of life – the common 
meanings; to mean the arts and leaning – the special processes of discovery and 
creative effort. Some writers reserve the word for one or other of these senses; I 
insist on both, and on the significance of their conjunction. The questions I ask 
about our culture are questions about our general and common purposes, yet also 
questions about deep personal meanings. Culture is ordinary, in every society and 
in every mind. (1989b: 4, added emphasis)  
 
I have quoted this at length because it shows the direction of Williams’ argument, and 
its originality, very clearly. As the highlighted passage brings out, it is the complex 
interrelation of ‘textual’ and ‘anthropological’ approaches to culture that was 
important to him.  
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This had two major advantages: it avoided abstracting cultural analysis from an 
analysis of the shared living conditions of that culture’s time; and it introduced a 
necessary distance from the value judgements about cultural production (present and 
historical) which happen to prevail at any particular time. The second advantage is 
that cultural analysis (as so conceived) apply just as appropriately to any work, 
whether ‘high’ or ‘low’: there is no question of ‘high’ culture being more worth 
investigating from this point of view. As Williams once put it: ‘our real purpose 
should be to bring all cultural work within the same world of discourse’ (1968: 133).  
 
It is easy to take this latter point for granted given four decades of cultural studies 
practice, so it is worth remembering how different Williams’ vision was from 
conventional analyses of culture at that time. The distinguished American sociologist, 
Edward Shils, for example, commented in 1961, as if it were plain fact, that: 
 
[there are] three levels of culture, which are levels of quality measured by 
aesthetic, intellectual and moral standards. These are ‘superior’ or ‘refined’ culture, 
‘mediocre’ culture, and ‘brutal culture’. (1961: 4, quoted in Tudor, 1995: 88-9)  
 
Can we really deny that a similar division is at work even now in the structuring of 
higher education and in press attacks (very common in Britain at least) on the status 
of media and cultural studies? Raymond Williams’ point remains a radical one. 
 
It is worth spelling out some further implications. The first is that Williams is not 
simply arguing that we pay more attention to ‘popular’ culture at the expense of elite 
culture. To do that would simply invert the high/low hierarchy without challenging it.  
 7
Instead Williams is arguing for a common culture: a shared culture based on what he 
calls a ‘recognition of practical equality’ between its members (1958: 305). Putting 
that into practice means a lot more than just avoiding judgements about cultural 
production you don’t like much. It means positively valuing everyone’s common 
experience in a shared culture, treating everyone’s experience of culture as valuable 
(1958: 306). It was this sense of valuing each other that was missing, according to 
Williams, in 1950s Britain: 
 
an effective community of experience . . . depends on a recognition of practical 
equality . . . We lack a genuinely common experience, save in certain rare and 
dangerous moments of crisis. What we are paying for this lack . . . is now 
sufficiently evident. We need a common culture, not for the sake of an abstraction, 
but because we shall not survive without it.  
(1958: 304) 
 
At the level of understanding how culture works, that meant seeing ‘communication’ 
in a much broader way than conventional literary studies allowed, and connecting 
with broader debates about democracy.   
 
In The Long Revolution (1961), Williams argued that  everyone, in making sense of 
the world, is an active producer of meanings, a creative interpreter (1961: ch. 1). From 
this he drew an important conclusion: 
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If man is essentially a learning, creating, communicating being, the only social 
organization adequate to his nature is a participating democracy in which all of us, 
as unique individuals, learn, communicate and control.  
(1961: 118, added emphasis) 
 
But 1950s Britain – and Williams was very clear on this – was not a democracy in this 
sense (1961: 339). Reversing this was what Williams meant by ‘the long revolution’: 
‘a cultural revolution [which] extend[ed] the active process of learning, with the skills 
of literary and other advanced communication, to all people rather than to limited 
groups’ (1961: 11). Williams was writing when the hopes for the transformative 
potential of television were still fresh, but the question remains a live one today, as we 
address fears of a digital divide and debate even the desirability of a shared culture.  
 
It would be a mistake, however, to see Williams’ work as the production of a ‘lone 
genius’. One little-known part of its context is the long history of adult education in 
Britain since the late 19th century, partly under the auspices of established universities 
such as Oxford. The judgement of one historian of the Workers’ Educational 
Association for whom Williams taught from 1946 to 1961 is interesting: 
 
We should be sceptical of portraits of Williams in the 1950s as isolated and 
unassociated with mainstream academic life. . . . Put simply, Williams’ work in 
[the 1950s] drew on the adult [education] tradition, especially as it had been 
developed in Oxford since the late nineteenth century, and may be said to have 
presented this intellectual lineage and way of understanding society to a large and 
receptive audience . . .  
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(Goldman, 1995: 291-2) 
 
The vision of culture as ‘ordinary’ was the result of a sustained social debate and 
teaching practice in Britain lasting more than half a century. I return to this point in 
my conclusion. 
 
There are also striking parallels between Williams’ cultural theory and work 
developed outside Britain and in very different circumstances. Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s 
book Decolonising the Mind (1986) develops a rich concept of culture, which itself 
grew out of debates in Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s about how literature should be 
taught in the post-colonial era. Just as Williams’ work responded to Britain’s 
‘expanding culture’ (1958: 12), so too Ngugi’s work can be seen as a response to a 
time of change, even crisis. Ironically, the crisis from which the Kenyan debate 
resulted arose from the imposition in Kenyan schools after World War II of precisely 
the English canon of literature whose influence Williams in a very different way was 
negotiating in Britain a decade or so before. It is, then, perhaps not surprising that 
Ngugi was aware of Raymond Williams’ work early on (Ngugi, 1986: 90), but tracing 
‘influences’ from Britain is definitely not the point. For Ngugi’s conception of culture 
developed precisely as resistance to the imposition of British culture from the outside. 
Nonetheless there are interesting parallels.  
 
Like Williams, Ngugi draws on Marx’s analysis in The German Ideology (1977) of 
how language and culture are formed in the course of the practices of everyday 
material life.1 Ngugi develops a rich notion of language as both direct means of 
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communication and as the carrier of a distinctive culture (1986: 15). Culture is to be 
seen as part of a complex lived process: 
 
There is a gradual accumulation of values which in time become almost self-
evident truths . . . Over a time this becomes a way of life distinguishable from 
other ways of life . . . Values are the basis of a people’s identity, their sense of 
particularity as members of the human race. All this is carried by language. 
Language as culture is the collective memory bank of a people’s experience in 
history.  
(Ngugi, 1986: 14-15)  
 
These values are reflected both in a way of life and in specific works, whether of the 
oral or written traditions. Ngugi’s notion of culture was specifically an attempt to 
think about his own language and culture (Gikuyu) that the British had set out to 
destroy by imposing an English-language based education system and literary culture 
(1986: 11-13). This was what Ngugi famously called the ‘cultural bomb’ which: 
 
annihilates a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their 
environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and 
ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-
achievement and it makes them want to identify with that which is furthest 
removed from themselves . . .  
(1986:  3) 
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Articulating the grounds of a common culture was, for Ngugi (1986: 103) as for 
Williams, a matter of democracy, but in conditions - of conflict with a dominant 
outside culture - very different from those Williams envisaged.  
 
Another interesting parallel for the notion of culture as ‘ordinary’ is Latin American 
work on popular culture, for example that of the Colombian media theorist Jesus 
Martin-Barbero (1993). Here the context is not, as with Ngugi, the early stages of a 
post-colonial regime, but rather the long-term consequences of the Spanish Conquest: 
the complex process of forging national unity in Latin American nations which are 
complex amalgams of indigenous, European, and mixed (mestizaje) populations, with 
enormous variations of literacy and material wealth (Rowe and Schelling, 1990).  
 
Like Ngugi, Martin-Barbero is well aware of the work of British cultural studies along 
with many other sources for studying the popular (history, anthropology, sociology), 
but, again, to trace a British ‘origin’ for his work is misleading. What matters is that 
in the particular Latin American postcolonial context a broad notion of popular 
culture, parallel to Williams’ concept of ‘common culture’, was necessary. As Martin-
Barbero explains:  
 
We are not dealing with an increase of information about popular culture in terms 
of statistics and factual data, but rather with a process that relocates the ‘place’ of 
the popular by incorporating it into the constitutive memory of the flow of history  
. . . this has begun to fragment the once monolithic concept of culture both at the 
level of the semantic universe and at the pragmatic level.  
(Martin-Barbero, 1993: 62) 
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Instead of a limited range of texts, culture had to be seen as a mass of social processes 
operating at many levels, in all its ‘ordinary’ local complexity.  
 
Extending the Values of Cultural Studies 
 
Parallels are important – they show that cultural studies can be seen as a coherent, but 
de-centred subject, not one whose narratives must retrace a Eurocentric, colonial 
trajectory (Wright, 1998) - but they are not enough. A radical transposition of the 
terms of Williams’ vision is necessary, if we are to address today’s cultural politics.  
 
The limitations of Williams’ work have frequently been noted. First, its reference-
points in a sense of purely local practice, inspired by the Welsh working-class 
community of his youth which, even when he wrote, was largely a nostalgic vision,2 
and quite inadequate to the actual cultural complexity of 1950s Britain (Gilroy, 1987: 
49-50), let alone the implications of Britain’s colonial past (Said, 1990: 83). To be 
fair, Williams’ notion of social identity and community was not completely closed, 
since he emphasised the need to convert a defensive solidarity into an acceptance of 
‘extending community’ (1958: 319). But this extension of community was imagined 
by Williams largely in terms of class; the conflictual terrain of ethnicity was not 
integrated into his thinking.  
 
Another limitation is, as Williams later admitted (1979: 148-9), that his notion of 
community and of culture did not recognise gender inequalities, and how these are 
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structured into the very organisation of cultural production. The need to correct for 
this is now so obvious that I will not discuss it further here.  
 
Thirdly, if the strength and clarity of Williams’ vision derives in part from a closure - 
around a particular historical ideal of community -  it thereby ignores the problems 
associated with cultural ‘closure’ itself. In the massive complexity of the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries, there are powerful arguments to be made (see especially 
Haraway, 1991) against closure, whether around a notion of culture that is ethnically 
or geographically exclusive, or around forms of intellectual authority that rely on 
hidden exclusions (the centuries-long association of the intellectual voice with the 
male voice), or even around a notion of ‘humanity’ (which may now need to be 
reevaluated in the light of our relationships with machines). Haraway’s vision of a 
committed partiality may, in some respects, be a more helpful guide to a world where 
any debate must start out from difference and from complexity. The contrast, 
however, between Haraway and Williams should not be too sharply drawn. Just as 
Williams at the end of the 1950s called for full literacy and full participation in 
cultural production as a response to changing times, so too Haraway is concerned with 
expanding literacy in the broadest sense: for example, the need to expand critical 
knowledge about the cultural claims made on behalf of science. For both, cultural 
studies is a crucial tool in avoiding a two-tier knowledge society. In a world, however, 
where the pressures to absorb education into commercial technoscience without 
remainder are so overwhelming, Haraway’s vision of a ‘politics’ - a ‘cyborg politics’ 
as she originally called it - that ‘struggle[s] for language and . . . against perfect 
communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly’ (1991: 
218) has a particular urgency. What may matter most are not claims of unity, but 
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alliances across difference, communities of dialogue which are not simple or ‘whole’, 
but are suspicious of universalising claims on behalf of science or technological 
‘destiny’.  This is to transpose Williams’ vision of dialogue onto a different, but not 
incompatible, register. 
 
We need to make a similar transposition of Williams’ values in relation to issues of 
‘race’3 and hybridity. Clearly Williams’ concept of culture – focussed on lived 
experience in particular locations – is inadequate to deal with cultures formed in 
movement, in the course of disruptions of location, whether voluntary or involuntary. 
It cannot, for example, help us understand the experience of the migrant workers who 
have lived in the Mexico-US border region in the past two decades or so. As the 
Argentinian cultural theorist Nestor Garcia Canclini, who has worked a great deal on 
the US-Mexican border region, argues, the challenge is to think about culture in the 
light of ‘the loss of the ‘‘natural’’ relation of culture to geographical and social 
territories’ (1995: 229, added emphasis), exactly the natural relation that Williams 
seems to assume as his ideal. At the same time, this loss of connection may be cut 
across by new patterns, new ‘natural’ relations, based on shared media experience, 
which reconfigure both private and public space. Canclini puts it as follows: 
 
Collective identities find their constitutive stage less and less in the city and in its 
history, whether distant or recent. . . . Almost all sociability, and reflection about it, 
is concentrated in intimate exchanges. Since . . . even the accidents that happened 
the previous day in our own city reach us through the media, these become the 
dominant constituents of the ‘public’ meaning of the city . . . More than an 
absolute substitution of urban life by the audiovisual media, I perceive a game of 
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echoes. The commercial advertising and political slogans that we see on television 
are those that we reencounter in the streets, and vice versa: the ones are echoed in 
the others. To this circularity of the communicational and the urban are 
subordinated the testimonies of history and the public meaning constructed in 
longtime [sic] experiences.  
(Garcia Canclini, 1995: 210, 212, original emphasis)  
 
‘Communication’ in this context cannot now simply mean (as it did for Williams) 
sharing a historically continuous set of experiences tied to a separate location. The 
connections between space, community, and culture have become too complex (cf 
Couldry, 2000, chapter 5) for such simple unities to be plausible, if they ever were.  
 
This is especially important when we think about cultures that have been formed in 
conflict (cf Hall, 1997). Contemporary black cultural critics in the USA address too a 
sense of cultural crisis, but one which does not admit of the affirmative solutions 
Williams imagined. Cornel West has written controversially of ‘nihilism’ in black 
communities in America: 
 
nihilism not as a philosophical doctrine that there are no rational grounds for 
legitimate standards or authority [but as] the lived experience of coping with a life 
of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.  
(West, 1992: 40, added emphasis).  
 
Whether or not he has Williams in mind, West’s emphasis on ‘lived experience’ turns 
Williams’ arguments on their head. The lived experience in question is not one of 
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‘settled’ community, but one of facing daily the ‘ontological wounds and emotional 
scars’ of living in a culture marked by racism (1992: 42). This experience cannot 
simply be ‘affirmed’. What is needed, West argues, is ‘prophetic criticism’: 
 
a self-critical and self-corrective enterprise of human ‘sense-making’ for the 
preserving and expanding of human empathy and compassion.  
(West, 1993: xi)  
 
At the very least, West argues, there must be a ‘double conciousness’, that is well 
aware of the Euro-American intellectual tradition’s implications in the material 
realities of imperialism and slavery (1993: xi). Nor can there be any simple 
affirmation of the ‘lived experience’ of place, given the continuance of racism. 
Instead, what cultural studies must address is something more like the experience of 
exile in time and space, a ‘homebound quest in an offbeat temporality’ (1993:  xiii). 
Such prophetic criticism is critical of the surrounding culture at a fundamental level, 
challenging the very category of ‘race’ and asking how ‘race’ is embedded in 
discursive and cultural hierarchies (cf Gates, 1986; Gilroy, 2000). 
 
Such criticism necessarily involves a complex self-critical relationship to collective 
experience and culture. A recent essay by David Lionel Smith expresses this 
powerfully: 
 
we [black cultural critics] must have the courage to risk alienating ourselves 
by challenging common sense, by being true critics and not mere celebrants of 
black culture, and by subverting the premises that define blackness. . . .  
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What then is black culture? No one can answer these questions definitively, 
because ‘black culture’ is not a fixed, single thing ‘out there’ in the empirical 
world. It is, rather, a complex and ambiguous set of processes and interactions, 
facts, and fantasies, assertions and inquiries, passionately held and 
passionately contested  
(Smith, 1997: 188, 192) 
 
The ‘necessity of creating a new culture’ (Mercer, 1994: 3, quoting Gramsci) is a 
theme which runs right through black cultural criticism in the USA, black British 
cultural studies, and postcolonial theory more widely. It is clear, then, that if we want 
cultural studies to go on addressing the (changing) conditions of ‘common culture’ - 
and if we do not, what useful continuity has cultural studies as a subject to offer? - 
then we must transpose the terms in which Williams originally formulated the debate: 
a common culture, not as the reproduction of ‘the same’, but as an open-ended 
encounter with difference, framed by a commitment to dialogue.  
 
Before formulating these values more fully – they lie at the heart of cultural studies – 
we need to appreciate some of the political context which makes this project, for all 
its difficulties, so urgent.  
 
Empty Radicalism: Education Without Dialogue 
 
What the different inflections of cultural studies I have discussed all share is a sense 
that education is more than the transmission of the already known. In a world where 
cultures are formed in conflict, and therefore shaped by existing imbalances of power, 
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education should provide a liminal space where the mutual influences of culture and 
power can be disentangled, and new perspectives on each generated. This is what 
Paulo Freire called ‘dialogue’: ‘the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in 
order to name the world’ (1972: 61). For this dialogue to occur, education needs 
space, a regular sustained context. That space need not, of course, be identical to the 
actual spaces of educational institutions; it should certainly extend beyond them. At 
present, however, the spaces for dialogue that exist within educational institutions are 
threatened with enclosure by economically-driven ends. In this section, I want to 
show how even a sympathetic would-be educational reformer (Charles Leadbeater in 
the UK) is blind to this threat.  
 
Charles Leadbeater is a former Financial Times and Independent journalist and writer 
for the now defunct Marxism Today. As a researcher, he has played a leading role in 
the think-tank Demos’ close relationship with Tony Blair’s New Labour, both before 
and after Blair’s election victory. His book Living on Thin Air received considerable 
attention when first published in 1999. It was widely identified as a vision close to 
Blair himself; indeed it had Blair’s endorsement on the dust-jacket. Its call for both 
‘an innovative and inclusive society’ (2000: 11) was in some ways the justificatory 
‘bible’ for which Blair’s uneasy combination of globalizing and communitarian 
rhetoric had been waiting. Indeed, the attention it received partly reflected the fact 
that until then it was precisely an articulated vision that Blair’s politics lacked (Marr, 
1999). 
 
Leadbeater, in fact, is harsh on old-style communitarianism for its emphasis on the 
stability of local, lived community; instead, he advocates new forms of trust and 
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social organization that can deal with accelerating global change and lives lived 
beyond fixed locales. This is not a crude neoliberalism, since it does take seriously the 
contributions which individuals make by working together both within formal 
organizations and beyond them, and many of its proposals for change (increasing 
employees’ stakes in their workplace, increasing local participation in politics) are 
welcome. So too is his interest in issues of citizenship. Leadbeater’s central idea is to 
encourage public sector ‘entrepreneurship’ whether within government, schools or the 
health service. In fact, Leadbeater shares with another critic of neoliberalism, Pierre 
Bourdieu, the concern with ‘reinventing public services’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 27). What I 
want to show, however, is that when, briefly, Leadbeater deals with education, his 
presumptions are incoherent, precisely because they fail to move beyond the 
‘autocratic technocracy’ which Bourdieu insists we must challenge. Leadbeater, in 
other words, lacks any sense of education, except one prefigured by the economy and 
its power structures.  
 
If there were more space, I could connect this weakness with other weaknesses in 
Leadbeater’s argument: his inadequate attention to the human costs of workplace 
instability (Sennett, 1999), and his underplaying of the forces of concentration and 
conflict in the so-called ‘knowledge economy’, not least the inequalities of which 
‘knowledge workers’ (including himself) are the principal beneficiaries. Yet while 
praising the innovation of California’s Silicon Valley, he acknowledges its poor 
public services and its heavy reliance on imported human capital (2000: 230, 236). 
This leads him to a curious admission that ‘[Silicon Valley’s] model of society driven 
by specialist knowledge is increasingly at odds with a more democratic model of the 
knowledge society’ (2000: 238). While Leadbeater seems to want such a model, he is 
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prevented from developing one precisely because of his inadequate concept of how 
education can contribute to democracy. It is on this specific weakness I want to 
concentrate.  
 
Even here, there are aspects of Leadbeater’s treatment of education which are 
welcome, for example his revival of Ivan Illich’s (1971) idea of de-schooling society, 
through making the educational resources of the school available to the wider 
community (2000: 112).  He extends this to a notion of continuous adult education, 
from which people can go on benefiting as their careers develop and change (or at 
least – and the ageist detail is surely not accidental – ‘throughout their twenties and 
thirties’: 2000: 242). This, he argues, should be facilitated by distance learning and 
modularisation of courses – again, perhaps, innocuous, if it were clear that this was  
merely designed to supplement existing educational access, rather than to replace the 
full-time educational context that a conventional degree structure offers. But this is 
exactly what is unclear in his book: Leadbeater writes as he wants to replace older 
more ‘rigid’ notions of higher education with a new, more ‘flexible’ model, whose 
principal benefit is that it is more closely tailored to economic conditions.  
 
Leadbeater hardly discusses educational content at all, so we are left to assume that 
the content which matters most in his scheme of things is that which most effectively 
services the economy. Without ever being explicit, Leadbeater’s book, by its absences 
more than by its inclusions, reproduces a notion of education as mere training,4 as 
‘kit’, in a currently fashionable English term, for economic performance. There is no 
place at all for any broader notion of education’s purpose, including its links with 
democratic debate.  
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This reduced notion of education as training is increasingly common and frequently 
elided with a notion of ‘liberated’ consumerism. So, for example, the director of the 
Education Counselling Service (an arm of the British Council) was recently quoted as 
saying, without qualification, that ‘education is becoming a consumer good, and 
people will exercise the same kind of parameters in making their decisions as they do 
for anything else’; and a new report of the central policy making body in British 
higher education (the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals) predicted a shift 
to a ‘a customer-focussed approach to education and learning’.5  Many academics 
have enthusiastically embraced this new educational ‘radicalism’, for example the 
feminist Dale Spender (2000) writing about online universities: 
 
This is not the old distance learning, but online classroom interaction. Consumers 
can choose when to start and when to stop. . . They can choose the tutors, the 
topics, the terms. They are savvy purchasers who may want the learning so that 
they can do the earning or they may buy the product simply for its pleasure or 
leisure value.      
 
Even if education’s effects cannot immediately be translated into economic activity, 
the deferred economic benefit needs to be assured. So Umberto Eco, announcing the 
opening of his Scuola Superiore di Studi Umanistici in Bologna, anticipated students’ 
and journalists’ questions thus: 
 
What we say to our students in communication studies is, ‘do not ask us what this 
degree will be useful for – between the time you enrol and when you leave so 
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many things will have happened that you will know what to invent while we 
won’t’. (quoted, Times Higher Education Supplement, 4 February, 2000, 10) 
 
In this approach to education, there is a ‘subtle conflation of the distinctive values of 
education with those of training’ (Taylor, 2000). Modernisation is merely the guise of 
a thorough-going marketisation (Rustin, 1998: 99). 
 
It is this economically driven ‘vision’ that dominates British government thinking on 
education and which Leadbeater has helped further entrench. Yet there is a void at its 
heart. As Henry Giroux has eloquently argued with the American case particularly in 
mind, but it applies equally to Britain: ‘knowledge becomes capital – a form of 
investment in the economy – but appears to have little value when linked to the power 
of self-definition or the capacities of individuals to expand the scope of freedom’ 
(2000b: 8). None of this is surprising for a Blair government that has swallowed 
whole the rhetoric of the ‘information society’, and announced its own ‘Information 
Society Initiative’. But it is a concern that even relatively progressive social visions of 
public institutional reform within British government circles are blind to how 
marketization is distorting the very frame of educational debate.  
 
To counter this, we need, like Leadbeater, to focus on the social values that underlie 
education and citizenship, but on rather different ones.  
 
Towards Common Ground? 
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If the values which underpin cultural studies are under threat, it is all the more 
important to state them clearly. I want to set out five values, which, taken together, 
represent common ground on which cultural studies can stand, or fall, as a discipline. 
Their apparent obviousness, from the perspective of a democratic view of culture, 
does not make them any less important to state. 
 
The first principle involves valuing what all members of a ‘culture’6 – any culture – 
have to say, in their own voice and not as spoken for by others, about their experience 
of that culture and its productions. What matters is not the achievement of one unified 
voice that covers over differences, but the multiplication of voices. So Donna 
Haraway in her Cyborg Manifesto writes of a ‘dream not of a common language, but 
of a powerful infidel heteroglossia’, a mass of different voices and languages (1991: 
223). bell hooks has made the same point, but emphasising the danger that others’ 
speech may already have been spoken for. Black cultural studies needs, she suggests, 
‘new ground’: 
 
a counter-hegemonic marginal space where radical black subjectivity is seen, not 
overseen by any authoritative Other claiming to know us better than we know 
ourselves.  
(hooks, 1991: 22,  original emphasis)  
 
At stake here is much more than a universal right to speak (a tower of Babel without 
mutual understanding). Necessarily involved is a second principle: the obligation to 
listen to those other voices.  
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Cultural studies has to be a space for both speaking and listening. This second 
principle is often forgotten, but it is crucial. As the postcolonialist critic Gayatri 
Spivak has put it: ‘for me, ‘‘Who should speak?’’ is less crucial than ‘‘‘Who will 
listen?’’’ (1990: 59, quoted in Mercer, 1994: 31). This applies to politics, to academic 
writing, and to teaching. The classroom itself needs to be a space where each person 
can be confident that their voice will be recognised and valued (hooks, 1994: 186). 
Yet the practice of listening – of bearing witness (hooks, 1991: 133) – to each other’s 
accounts of living inside culture is only just beginning to be theorised. There are 
continuities here with what Williams wrote forty years ago at the end of Culture and 
Society: 
 
A good community, a living culture, will . . . not only make room for but actively 
encourage all and any who can contribute to the advance in consciousness which is 
the common need. Wherever we have started from, we need to listen to others who 
started from a different position.  
(1958: 320, added emphasis)  
 
This principle can apply to many different settings: from the interclass politics of 
1950s Britain, to the cultural and racial politics of today’s USA, to the complex 
negotiations in many parts of the world with globally distributed, commodified 
culture.  
 
Cultural studies, however, should involve not only dialogue, but also reflexivity (this 
is the third principle), including reflection about the means through which all the 
voices in that dialogue have been formed, and the conditions which have produced the 
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space of cultural studies itself. That means reflecting both on ourselves and on the 
culture around us: does, for instance, that culture satisfy the principles of cultural 
democracy, which the first two principles encapsulate? Critical reflection on shared 
culture, of course, carries risks: of being misunderstood as elitist or unconstructive.7  
The risk is unavoidable, but in taking it we must, as John Frow (1995) has argued, be 
fully self-reflexive about the institutional power which enables us to be publicly 
critical. Cultural studies is the work of critical intellectuals; it is not itself part of the 
popular domain which it discusses, and implying otherwise is bad faith.   
 
If such reflexivity is to be effective, it must be theoretically adequate to what it 
reflects upon. In looking at how voices and cultures are formed, it must adopt a 
materialist perspective (the fourth principle). Cultural phenomena – and this is a 
common thread throughout the history of cultural studies, wherever it has been 
practised – are always material processes, which are far from transparent. Who is 
represented in them, and how? Who has access to them, and on what terms? And who 
does not? Studying culture, then, means examining how hierarchies and exclusions, as 
well as inclusions, work within culture, whether those of race, class, gender, sexuality, 
education, age or the relations of power that exist between large-scale cultural 
formations (colonialism, imperialism, economic domination). These questions apply 
on all social and geographical scales: personal, local, national, global.  
 
These values, while easily stated, do not yield simple answers when applied, in 
combination, to understanding our lives inside culture. There are dilemmas: how are 
we to give adequate weight to both speaking and listening, to both self-reflexivity and 
critical analysis? How can we develop a materialist analysis, which is respectful of the 
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individual voice? How can we grasp both the complex texture of difference and the 
large-scale inequalities of power?  
 
Only through open dialogue, which is committed to applying these principles, which 
leads to the fifth and final principle. Quite simply, the first four principles have to be 
actively defended through the work of cultural studies itself. There is no automatic 
consensus in their favour. Cultural democracy, for which they are necessary 
conditions, is not a ‘natural’ state, even if we can argue for it on rational grounds. If it 
is to be more than fine ambition, cultural studies must be an empowering practice, a 
practice which acts directly upon the conditions of culture to change them. 
 
Cultural studies, in whatever capacity we practise it – as teacher, student, advocate, or 
critic – involves an enduring ethical commitment which is no more reducible to short-
term consumption choices than are the values of democracy itself. In both cases, there 
are, of course, powerful forces ranged to convince us otherwise, for the enclosure of 
education for economically defined ends is one aspect of the impoverishment of 
democracy itself. 
 
Conclusion: Learning (and Teaching) from Experience 
 
Cultural studies’ values must be translated into how we pass on the subject to students 
and beyond them to the wider culture, especially in a commercialised culture which is 
hostile to those values. In this article, I have tried to radicalise Raymond Williams’ 
vision of cultural studies’ values and put it into dialogue with visions from other times 
and places, but in concluding I want to recall that Williams was concerned also with 
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the practical question of how to teach culture in modern societies and his writings on 
this still resonate today. 
 
Important to the British adult education movement in which Williams participated 
was the principle that education is central to democracy, and must be responsive to 
the life experiences of those it teaches. Williams’ explicit aim in the writings and 
teaching that later emerged as cultural studies was ‘the creation of an educated and 
participating democracy’ (1993a [1961]: 223). He saw democratic principles 
extending into the classroom:  
 
Popular education in any worthwhile sense begins from a conception of human 
beings which . . . insists that no man can judge for another man [sic], that every 
man has a right to the facts and skills on which real judgement is based, that, in this 
sense, all education depends on the acknowledgement of an ultimate human 
equality.  
(Williams, 1993b [1959]: 123-24)  
 
This vision remains important today, for example, in the work of the educational and 
cultural theorist Henry Giroux.  
 
Giroux, like many writers discussed in this article, has developed his approach to 
cultural studies in response to a crisis, a crisis in educational and cultural authority in 
contemporary multicultural America as a whole: 
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The emergence of the electronic media coupled with a diminishing faith in the 
power of human agency has undermined the traditional visions of schooling and 
the meaning of pedagogy. 
(Giroux, 1996: 73) 
 
Unlike authoritarian attacks on American cultural collapse, Giroux is concerned to 
understand the real changes in the conditions under which young people now make 
sense of the culture they live in (not necessarily ‘their’ culture): 
 
Youth . . . are faced with the task of finding their way through a decentred cultural 
landscape no longer caught in the grip of a technology of print, closed narrative 
structures, or the certitude of a secure economic future.  
(1996: 74) 
 
In this situation, books (our books!) are just one tool among many, and often not the 
most relevant. Cultural studies, if is to address these cultural realities, must open up 
chances for cultural production by the students themselves. Doing cultural studies 
means, as Giroux explains, getting critical skills, demystifying the processes of 
representation through examining how meanings are produced, becoming aware of 
representation’s underlying politics. It means ‘cultural recovery’: recovering histories 
that you have not heard before (1996: 89), including your own; it means finding a 
voice.  
 
There are, of course, many ways of finding a voice, and academic education connects 
with just one of them. But, as an academic practice, cultural studies is unique in that it 
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treats the process of finding a voice as part of what it studies (Couldry, 2000, chapter 
6). This involves, of course, teachable skills, but it is not reducible to ‘training’, 
unless we mean training to be active and critical participants in the surrounding 
culture, training for citizenship. Citizenship, if it is to be more than empty formalism, 
requires an engagement with the claims of others, with questions of justice. But, as 
the political philosopher Seyla Benhabib (1992) argues, justice requires always an 
engagement with ‘the concrete other’, not merely an abstract, generalised other. For 
justice and therefore for an adequate notion of citizenship, there must be a 
commitment to dialogue with concrete others.8 If we take seriously the material 
constraints on others, indeed oneself, entering into dialogue and acquiring a voice, 
then cultural studies’ reflexive work becomes part of the dialogue integral to 
contemporary citizenship as a whole.  
 
Cultural studies should not just study, but embody, the conditions for new forms of 
democratic political exchange, ‘restoring the language of ethics, agency, power and 
identity’ (Giroux, 1996: 53). This is the true moving force of cultural studies as a 
discipline.9 That means, always, listening to the experiences of others. Raymond 
Williams, in a letter written at the end of his work for the WEA, reflected in these 
terms: 
 
The tutor . . . may not know the gaps between academic thinking and actual 
experience among many people; he [the tutor, as opposed to the student] may not 
know when, in the pressure of experience, a new discipline has to be created. 
(1993a [1961]: 224). 
 
 30
Cultural studies was that new discipline, and yet we are a long way from achieving, 
anywhere, the participatory culture for which Williams hoped. Worse, cultural studies 
must now defend its values against prevailing educational discourses which would 
deny the very space of dialogue on which Williams’ vision relied. 
 
Ironically – but a hidden irony, that we must insist others confront – it is a 
commodified culture, whose categorical imperative is flexibility and the embracing of 
ceaseless change, that denies the space for making the one change that would matter: 
the construction of a common culture, a space for hearing each others’ questions 
about how we belong, with no guarantee of answers. If cultural studies matters, it is 
because it still values the possibility of such a space. 
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1
 Ngugi (1986: 11-13); cf Williams (1989: 7).  
2
 As even Williams suggests (1961: 325).  
 
3
 I use the term ‘race’ in scare quotes in order to register the major critique of ‘race’ as a socially 
constructed form of difference that has characterised cultural studies and other subjects in the past 
decade or so: see especially Appiah (1986), Gates (1986). 
4
 For powerful critiques of this notion of education, see Giroux (2000 a and b), Freire (1972, 1999). 
5
 Quoted respectively in Times Higher Education Supplement, 31 March 2000, 9, and 24 March 2000, 
1. 
6
 ‘Culture’ is in scare quotes because we need to reexamine the idea that there are such things as 
‘cultures’, or instead something more complex (see Couldry, 2000: ch. 5).  
7
 Cf bell hooks’ important reflections on this issue (1991: 1-14). 
8
 See also Stevenson (1997). 
 
9
 Tony Bennett (1993) is right that cultural studies, like all disciplines, is constrained by its institutional 
setting, but I feel he exaggerates the point. 
